1. Wishing to distance myself from the pathologies associated with the words slum and slum dweller, I identify residents who are living in housing not approved by the city government as settlers (who live in settlements).
2. In intermittent water supply systems, water mains are only charged with pressured water for certain times of the day. This system allows for contaminated water to seep into the network from the surrounding earth at other times of the day. In a 24-7 system, officials suggested, lines would be pressured all the time, preventing contamination through the seepage of untreated water.
Leaky States
sought to be moved from engineers managing distribution by controlling the duration of water supply to customers moderating their consumption based on price. Particularly because a 24-7 water supply requires a less leaky, more watertight infrastructure, the World Bank funded the Water Distribution Improvement Project (WDIP) to recommend structural reforms necessary to "improve" Mumbai's water supply in 2004. 3 Central to this project was a consultant-driven study and a water audit in K-East ward, one of the twenty-four wards in the city. Between 2004 and , the World Bank's consultants, including Haresh, worked to measure and classify the volumes of water flowing and leaking in the ward. Unhappy with how the resulting figures cast them in a poor light, engineers of the municipal water department questioned the protocols and results of the study and discredited the leakage figures generated by the consultants. Thus, where it was hoped that the water audit would produce leakage figures that would both diagnose the water problem and underscore the need for reforms, the instability of these figures in Mumbai did not enable any technopolitical interventions on the network. What the shaky figures did instead was to demonstrate the extent to which the ignorance of leakages structured the politics, natures, and technologies of the city.
In this article I explore the political and technical controversies of measuring water leakages in Mumbai to argue that the dense historical accretions of technology, material, and social life that form hydraulic infrastructures in Mumbai challenge the audit cultures of neoliberal government. While the form of the water audit required the World Bank consultants to assume that there was no relation between the social and material agents of loss, I demonstrate how the hidden relations between the pipes, engineers, and residents that form the city undermined the consultants' efforts to make this figure stable and powerful.
I make this argument with two caveats. First, I do not try to measure how much water is "really" leaking in the city. In fact, I point to the impossibility of this effort amid the social and material relations that form Mumbai's water infrastructure. Second, I do not wish to suggest that massive leakages are unique to cities of the South. Leakages are not a pathology of the "undeveloped" infrastructures of cities in the "developing" world, nor are they an effect of the malfeasance or ineptitude of state officials. Aging infrastructures leak profusely in cities all over the 3. Still recovering from the very public opposition to and subsequent collapse of World Bank -supported water privatization projects in Delhi and Bangalore, both the World Bank and its consultants repeatedly tried to assure people that the project in Mumbai was about "improvement" and not privatization. Although it is officially known as the Water Distribution Improvement Project, state officials, engineers, residents, and even the odd anthropologist were told "not to call this privatization" (author's field notes).
world (Bornstein 2014) . Engineers and technicians working with water systems everywhere are only too familiar with both the ubiquity of leakage and the difficulties of repairing it. For instance, approximately 30 percent of New York City's water is estimated to be leaking (Murley 2011) . For reasons I describe below, leakages that were detected in New York's water system twenty years prior were only beginning to be repaired in 2008, despite the fact that these tunnels leaked like "sieves" (Belson 2008) . In water systems around the world, leakage is a troubling matter to apprehend, locate, and repair.
Instead, I wish to draw attention to the ways that leakages (and knowledges about leakage) are often beyond the institutional control of the very municipal departments that have designed and managed these water systems. City water engineers often ignore, and are ignorant of, the degree of leakage in water systems. These ignorances do not always undermine their authority. In fact, leaky pipes in the city constantly require (and produce) the authority and work of various urban experts -plumbers, politicians, and city water engineers. For over a million of Mumbai's residents who have been ineligible to receive water legally, leakages allow them access to the vital substance without them having to riot for it. Leakages therefore are more than just losses. They are uncontrolled, unknown flows of water that structure the lives and states formed by the city's water supply infrastructure.
By providing a situated account of leakage in the city, in this article I draw attention to the way that these unaccounted flows of water are subject not only to the political regimes of humans but also to the politics effected by the materials and histories of the city's water infrastructure (Braun and Whatmore 2010; Bennett 2010) . In this dynamic and contingent system, water leaks in Mumbai in ways that make it difficult to measure, count, and regulate. Its various flows produce differentiated and compromised forms of knowledge and ignorance in the city. 4 As water leaks in ways that state engineers struggle to control, I recalled Haresh's words about water being more effectively governed by approximation and estimation. Indeed, as I followed city water engineers repairing the water infrastructure in everyday life, I observed how their efficacy depended less on measurementenabled interventions and more on actively negotiated, informal technologies of repair. Their authority over the hydraulic network was based on knowing both how to repair leakages and when to ignore them.
4. Since the leakage figures first called for a project of state reform, and then destabilized it, we might consider water leakages as a nonconstitutive outside -a "History 2" to the form and reform of the city's hydraulic state (see Chakrabarty 2000) .
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The State of Ignorance Over the past two decades, scholars of politics have drawn attention to the ways that states construct their authority by making diverse social and natural landscapes legible through modernist technologies of measurement (Scott 1998) . Through documentary practices such as the census, the cadastral map, the property record, and the intake form (Anderson 1983; Appadurai 1993; Hull 2012b; McKay 2012) , textual artifacts permit authorities to examine the positions and circulations of things in complex spaces and allow for bureaucratic intervention in the world (Poovey 1998; Hull 2012a; Sharma and Gupta 2006) . Where work on state formation has examined how power relations are produced by and productive of such practices of knowledge making, in this article I address the work of ignorance in maintaining state institutions (Mathews 2008; McGoey 2012) .
In popular terms, ignorance has a negative value. Popularly defined as a lack, as a "want of knowledge" (Oxford English Dictionary), ignorance, in the Enlightenment tradition, is a pejorative term that frequently identifies a background of darkness and stupidity upon which projects of knowledge making are staged. Here knowledge is the key to achieving the good life and the good society, and the ignoramus is undesirable both because he or she doesn't have knowledge and because he or she doesn't want to know (Bishop and Phillips 2006) . Nevertheless, as scholars have recently shown, ignorance is not the residue of knowledge-making projects, nor is it emergent in an inability to see the truth (High, Kelly, and Mair 2012) . As scholars of social and natural disasters have shown, ignorance is oftentimes generated with knowledge in fields of power relations between persons, technologies, and discourses (Foucault 1982; Perrow 1982; Klinenberg 2002; Fortun 2001) .
For instance, Adriana Petryna (2002) , in her ethnography of the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown, has shown how officials dealing with its aftermath both refused and obfuscated the effects of the disaster not through the production of knowledge about the event but instead through the management of ignorance about its conditions and effects (see also Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) . Petryna (2002: 29) draws on the work of Hans Blumenburg to argue that ignorance "refers to 'a praxis, a method, a path to a certain sort of attitude.' " Ignorance is powerful stuff that "is as potent and multiple a thing as knowledge" (Sedgwick 1988, quoted in Bishop and Phillips 2006: 181) . As a praxis that takes effort and deliberateness, ignorance actively participates in the production of knowledge, power, and truth. Ignorance, therefore, is not so much a lack of knowledge as it is a form of not knowing that, like knowledge, participates in the production of meanings, materials, persons, and institutions (McGoey 2012).
Thus, when I describe the worlds of ignorance in this article, it is not to signal a lack of competency on the part of the engineers of the city water department or its consultants. Instead, I wish to explore the political effects of ignorance as it congeals in different expert locations to bring particular kinds of institutions and subjects into being. Unlike the bureaucracies imagined by Max Weber, no one office or water expert has a comprehensive knowledge of how the system works in Mumbai. Engineers working in Mumbai's water department are each ignorant and knowledgeable of different leakages in different ways. At the same time, I wish to emphasize that ignorance is not only generated by the (human) will not to know (Bourdieu 1977) , as a technology of politics. By drawing attention to the ignorances that congeal around subterranean pipes and their leakages, I argue that ignorance is also brought into being by the political effects of the technologies that constitute the city's infrastructure. 5 These ignorances, I will show, sometimes articulate with, but exceed, purposive human action. They reveal the limits of human power to govern, regulate, and control the obdurate material infrastructures that structure the city (see also Collier 2011) .
The Controversies of Measurement
Over the past one and a half centuries, Mumbai's water system has been extended and managed amid heightened concern over the scarcity of water. In private and public conversations in the city, water shortage is presented as a critical constraint on the city and its future growth. It is because of water shortage, we are told, that the city is unable to supply water for twenty-four hours a day. It is because of water shortage, we learn, that the city government is required to produce, manage, and effect a water schedule, where different neighborhoods in the city receive their daily supply at a fixed time, for a few hours a day. The discourses of water shortage enable continuous construction and expansion of Mumbai's hydraulic infrastructure. Yet according to the government documents I have reviewed and the senior water engineers I have interviewed, it is apparent that there is already enough water entering Mumbai for all residents of the city. 6 Consistent with the 5. In recent years, scholars in science studies and geography have drawn attention to the vital and political materialities of infrastructural systems and have urged that we also consider nonhumans as participants in our political cultures (Haraway 1991; Braun and Whatmore 2010) . For instance, Jane Bennett in her work on electricity advocates paying attention not only to the social but also to the material actants that form infrastructure. She argues that electricity grids are "living, throbbing confederations" of human and nonhuman relations (Bennett 2010: 24) .
6. According to figures presented by the Hydraulic Engineering Department at the India Urban Space Conference in 2007, 92 percent of the city's daily supply of 3.35 billion liters is distributed Leaky States diagnosis provided by Haresh, I believe that the problems of "water shortage" have more to do with the leakages in the city's largely unknown and unmetered water mains that connect the reservoirs to people's homes.
The Mumbai Municipal Corporation (colloquially known as the BMC) assumes a leakage figure of 25 percent (Bombay Municipal Corporation 1994) . With over half the city's water meters not working, however, it is unclear how this figure is calculated. Further, many of the older connections in the city do not have meters at all. Through fieldwork conducted over nearly two years, I never learned how the water department calculates water consumption or leakage when the tools and meters of measurement are silent and unreliable. With water meters not working (or not being used), how does the city water department know how much water is being used by industries, businesses, and residents? If the department doesn't know how much water is being used in the city, how is it able to know how much water is leaking? Accordingly, much of Mumbai's water, it seems, should be unaccounted for. Yet if it remains unclear how the city produces consumption and leakage figures, it is clear that the figures the city produces are frequently put to work in conversations, news reports, and planning documents to show that the city water department is an effective, able, and competent utility, one that does not need "assistance" from multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 7 By indexing the strength and order of the water department, the figures allow engineers to long forestall programs of structural adjustment, improvement, and privatization pushed and proposed by these agencies.
Nevertheless, in 2004 the World Bank worked with the federal Ministry of Urban Development to approve a project to "improve the management and distribution of water" through a pilot study in K-East ward, in the northern part of the city (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2007). The consultants conducted a water audit in the ward, to find out that nearly 40 percent of the ward's water was leaking. As the leakage figures began to circulate in the offices of senior engineers, they were to household consumers (Hydraulic Engineering Department, MCGM 2008) . Accounting for 25 percent leakage, the water availability for each of the city's 12.5 million residents should be 188 liters per day. This figure is significantly greater than daily per capita water use figures in Hong Kong (112 liters), Shanghai (143 liters), and London (146 liters) and is comparable to daily per capita water use in Singapore (183 liters) (Gulyani, Talukdar, and Kariuki 2005; Castalia Strategic Advisors 2007) .
7. Thus the city water department provided figures for a report produced by the Asian Development Bank (Ministry of Urban Development, India, and Asian Development Bank 2007) about the state of urban water utilities in India to suggest that 100 percent of the city's population was covered by the network and that unaccounted-for water constituted 13.6 percent of total supply. When combined with the operating profits of the water department, these figures present an image of a strong, well-functioning water utility.
outraged. The figures threatened the image of capability that they had carefully cultivated over the years. Suspicious of the figures, senior engineers began to publicly discredit the work of the consultants and questioned the motives of the study. For instance, in a conversation about the project, one senior engineer told me how "the World Bank wants to create the story . . . of 40 percent leakages so that they can privatize the system." To substantiate his claim, he described how the consultants had prepared privatization contract documents prior to the study, as indication of the kinds of initiatives the leakage numbers were sought to call for and justify. Following such suspicions, the city water department publicly began questioning the methodologies and motivations of the consultants. Its engineers provided activists and journalists with internal memos that demonstrated how the numbers of the WDIP were in fact a thinly veiled process to privatize the department. As local journalists began to report on disputes between city engineers and consultants, they pointed to the difficulties the consultants were having in measuring leakage. Take, for instance, a story published on June 2, 2007, in the news daily Mid-Day:
, a New Zealand water consultancy firm, working on a pilot project at K-east ward in Andheri (E) [,] has been unable to calculate the amount of water the ward loses to leakages. The project, which aims to explore the feasibility of giving distribution rights to a private body on behalf of the BMC, submitted its first report in 2003.
The BMC refuted the report that it lost 40 percent of the water supplied in K-east to leakages. In the second report, submitted in 2005, Castalia pegged the loss at 14 percent (Rao 2007) . In the tense standoff that followed, World Bank officials arrived in Mumbai to save the WDIP and its reform efforts. When I asked after the process months later, consultants and city water engineers recounted the tense negotiations and bitter disputes between city engineers and World Bank officials and their consultants. Faced with the prospect of the city water department rejecting their report, the management consultants agreed to make small conciliatory gestures toward the water department. They represented leakage not by using the formula of the standard water balance (see below) but instead by using a different formula to produce a leakage figure not as dissonant with the one generated by the city water department. A PowerPoint slide they showed at a subsequent meeting demonstrates the conflict over leakage figures ( fig. 1 ). On the bottom left-hand corner, just below the amended "loss" figure of 21 percent, lies another figure that contradicts it: "For every ten liters billed, six liters are lost." That is to say that six of sixteen liters, or 37 percent of K-East's water, is leaking away -either to the ground or for other unauthorized human uses.
Leaky States
Through projects to measure water flows in the city, both consultants and city engineers seek to make the city's water governable. Nevertheless, efforts to measure water leakage are consistently compromised, questioned, and challenged in the city. This is not because either the city's engineers or the World Bank's consultants are cynical or corrupt. Leakage is extremely difficult to measure, and, amid a political controversy, neither the World Bank nor the city water engineers are able to stabilize the measure of leakage, despite their best intentions. Where so many places and things have been made governable by neoliberal technology of the audit (Strathern 2000; Hetherington 2011 ), the material and social accretions of Mumbai's water infrastructure challenge the stability of this political technology to govern water in the city. To better understand why water is so difficult to measure, I first address the specific methodology of audit that is ascendant in the calculation of water flows in Mumbai and beyond. I then follow the way that the material politics of water infrastructure in the city rendered the results of the audit unstable and unreliable amid a controversial reform project. 
Accounting for Leakage
Audits have become a key technology to evaluate, compare, and "improve" the workings of institutions, including nongovernmental organizations, states, and other service providers in different parts of the world (Strathern 2000) . While water utilities previously used a variety of formulas and protocols to calculate leakage, in 2000 the International Water Association (IWA) published a "standard water balance" protocol that sought to standardize regimes of water accounting and thereby make urban water systems in different parts of the world comparable (Lambert and Hirner 2000) . Since then, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have conducted training workshops to teach urban administrators and water engineers in India how they might perform an audit using the standard water balance, in part so that they can "benchmark" the performance of their water utilities against each other (see Ministry of Urban Development, India, and Asian Development Bank 2007; World Bank 2006). It was therefore not surprising that the World Bank appointed consultants to measure the flows of water in Mumbai's water network in this way.
In its most basic form, the standard water balance table (table 1) seeks to measure and account for water being consumed and leaking in an urban water network. Through the table, consumption and loss are parsed into different, discrete, and measurable kinds of water flow. Thus water consumption by unauthorized users is defined as "apparent loss" (and is sometimes described as "social leakage" [Anand 2011a]) . As apparent loss, it is the loss not of water per se but of revenue to the city water department. "Real loss" (or physical leakage), by comparison, is deemed to be where water "just" leaks into the ground. Produced in a moment where flows of water are monetized, the water balance table is centered on the production of figures for nonrevenue water (NRW) -that is, water that is not being billed by the city utility. IWA water experts produce the category of NRW so as to identify and empower efforts to reduce it through a series of strategies including leakage detection, universal metering, and customer service. Through continuous efforts to measure and reduce NRW, the consultants suggest, the city could improve its water infrastructure.
While the form of the table appears neat and ordered, it was difficult to discipline water to fit the table's expectations. The consultants were challenged in their attempts to measure the kinds of consumption and leakage that were required by the table. For instance, without customer meters that worked, the consultants were unable to verify how much water residents consumed. Much like the city engineers whose figures they sought to replace, the consultants calculated the volume of water flowing through nonworking meters by estimating the actual consumption of those customers who receive estimated bills (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2007). It was even more difficult to measure the leakages in the network because, as leakage, neither their quantity nor their quality (as apparent or real loss) was known or recorded by the city water department. Fieldwork above the ground didn't help either. In fact, while conducting small tours of the area's slums, the consultants acknowledged that they were unable to find a single unauthorized connection. As such, consultants were unable to measure apparent and real leakages in situ, but derived these leakage figures using speculative 
Public Culture
Published by Duke University Press forms of reasoning that were embedded in the assumptions of the water balance table. 8 Thus the figures of real and apparent loss were derived from the water table and not by independent measurement. This procedure is not, in and of itself, an unusual practice of accounting or audit. Accounting systems seldom gather accurate representations of quality and quantity and often depend on political authority, replicable procedures, and discreet fictions to stabilize them as facts (Poovey 1998) . 9 In Mumbai, however, neither the procedures of the audit nor its results were stable, reproducible, or verifiable. Both the procedures of measurement and the facts of leakage, represented by numbers, emerged from incomplete knowledges that were constantly challenged and transformed by city engineers and other experts throughout the project.
For instance, city engineers questioned the use of ultrasonic meters that were installed for the audit, arguing instead that magnetic meters might be more accurate because of the peculiar, timed ways that water flows through water mains in Mumbai. They also challenged the audit's methods of accounting by asking after the unknown and unknowable flows of water that passed through city pipes in nonsupply hours. Facing a barrage of questions they did not have the knowledges to answer because of the ways that the intermittent water system produced ambiguity and ignorance, the consultants were unable to respond to the city engineers.
8. For instance, by suggesting that total loss was the sum of real and apparent loss, they assumed that real and apparent losses were discrete and measurable events. To produce figures of apparent loss (unauthorized water consumption), the consultants subtracted the amount of (estimated) authorized water consumption from an extrapolated figure of water consumption they derived based on the census figures and random surveys of commercial facilities. While they acknowledge that the census figures aren't reliable (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2007; see also Bhan and Jana 2013) and that unauthorized commercial water theft figures may in fact be an underestimate, they nevertheless generalize from them, arguing that 33 million of the 110 million liters of water lost in the ward daily are because of illegal commercial and residential connections. To calculate the "real loss" of water through leakages on city mains, they deduce that this would be the loss that remains after their estimated "apparent loss" is accounted for (that is to say, 77 million liters a day).
9. It is because of such reliable and stable systems of representation, Mary Poovey (1998) has argued, that numbers are able to stand as if they were independent facts. Poovey demonstrates that accounting is a method of ordering knowledge that produces reliability not because the numbers generated represent sufficient and reproducible results, but because the protocols of measurement, and of representing uncertainty and ignorance, are stabilized through arbitrary yet normalized rulebound procedures. I would like to thank Joseph Masco and Joseph Hankins for drawing my attention to the ordinary instability of numbers.
The Ignorance of Loss
Thus, while engineers and consultants each generated numbers that sought to underscore their proficiency, no one could produce a clear understanding of how much of Mumbai's water was leaking, where it was going, or what could be done to reduce its quantities. The process of measuring water in Mumbai was fragile not only because of the political interests (and disagreements) between the World Bank's consultants and city engineers. As Shaylih Muehlmann (2012: 348) shows in a study of the Colorado River delta, measuring water flow is a difficult process anywhere because "water resists quantification through its constant motion and unpredictability" (see also Von Schnitzler 2013). Its many "unexpected exits [and] entryways" make its dynamic flows difficult to quantify (Muehlmann 2012 ; see also Coelho 2006) . For instance, in Mumbai, engineers and consultants had strong, irreconcilable disagreements about the quantities of water that were leaving the ward's administrative limits undetected in nonsupply hours.
These uncertainties were produced not only by water but also by the technologies of water measurement. For instance, engineers know water meters to be unreliable. The IWA report even begins with a section on the importance of reliable metering, noting that meters themselves "require careful management" (Lambert and Hirner 2000: 3) . Meters are prone to a host of problems including encrustation, deterioration with age, and unreliable flow rates (ibid.). At times, particulate blockage can increase the water pressure through the meter, causing elevated readings (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2007). The reliability of meters is further compromised in intermittent systems. With water being redirected somewhere in the city every two minutes, the consultants told me that the ever-changing pressures mean that water flows in pipes are always "going crazy," making them difficult to measure using flow calculations. In intermittent systems, water meters also register readings for the column of air that precedes the flow of water daily. 10 Amid these instabilities, the IWA protocols to measure and quantify different kinds of leakage could only be ambiguous and improvised. The protocols specified vague procedures such as using "the best means available" (Lambert and Hirner 2000: 5) to measure consumption and leakage, without so much as suggesting what these means might be.
Even as Lambert and Hirner remain vague about measuring leakage, their water balance protocol requires that engineers classify and measure not only the quantities of leakage but also the different qualities of leakage -as "apparent" 10. Finally, even if these meters were accurate, their readings are often occluded by meter readers in the city, who are often a source of both deliberate and accidental error.
or "real" losses (see table 1 ). There is much to be said for the human effort that is invested in imagining and categorizing loss to be distinctly real and apparent. The distinction, like all modernist distinctions, provides routes for human agency and intervention in the water system. Nevertheless, real and apparent losses do not exist a priori. Emerging from the water balance protocol is the assumption that apparent and real leakages are discrete events owing either to the political "software" of the infrastructure (laws, policies, access regimes, etc.) or to the technical, apolitical "hardware" of the network (pipes, valves, etc.; see Latour 1996) . 11 In everyday worlds of leakage, however, the distinctions between "real" and "apparent" loss are ambiguous. For instance, people illegally tapping into water lines cause apparent loss (when they consume this water) and real loss (when untapped water also drains into the ground). Conversely, as water leaks into the city's ground, residents in the city may also later find and extrude this subsurface water from wells and springs. Indeed, residents of the city speculate that leaky city pipes regularly replenish these "natural" sources of water (Gudilu 2008 ; see also Belson 2008) .
Therefore, as engineers and consultants try to govern, count, and control Mumbai's water, they face significant difficulties in determining the quantities and qualities of leakage. They are challenged by learning both how much water leaks and how much of this loss is "apparent" or social and how much is "real" or physical. While the engineers of the water department and those of the consulting agency actively produce leakage figures to legitimate their expertise, the unknown flows of water in the network also permit these figures (and their authorities) to be contested and discredited in the city.
Fixing Leaks
Leakages permeate water systems in many parts of the world, and fixing them presents a variety of challenges. It is hard, for instance, to shut down water lines for maintenance, when people need water from them every day. Water networks are generally buried deep underground, and fixing leaks is difficult, necessary, and time-consuming work. While the technologies of designing and installing new water infrastructures have changed a little in recent years, repairing leaks remains unglamorous work that tests the limits of repair technologies (Bornstein 2014) .
For instance, despite knowing of the leakages in New York's water tunnels for 11. Water reform experts at the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program frequently speak of the software and hardware of water infrastructures, as if they were discrete (pers. comm., February 15, 2008). decades, the city's water department only recently invested in a concerted effort to repair them. A New York Times article detailed the difficulty of that repair project (Belson 2008) . Because these lines are buried deep underground and cannot be turned off, the city recruited deep-sea divers to live for a month underground in a twenty-four-foot pressurized tank. They were then periodically lowered seventy stories into water tunnels in a diving bell to work in twelve-hour shifts to repair the leaky valves. Like the leakages in New York, leakages in other urban water systems are often situated at the very limits of human responsibility, knowledge repair, and control. They are often significantly easier to ignore than they are to repair.
Because the repair work of city water engineers is situated in deeply ambivalent social-technical environments, engineers use their management skill not so much as authoritarian rulers but as experts compromised by the politics, labor, and materials of urban water infrastructures. Far from being a mechanical process, maintenance makes visible the sociological and technical work that engineers are required to perform as they deploy their ingenuity and improvisational skill to manage its different effects. To ensure that the system continues to function, engineers need to work with the city's pipes, plumbers, residents, and a range of actors mobilized around the provision of water in everyday life. Thus engineers need not only to know but also not to know certain aspects of the problem in order to do their work. With leakage as a condition of water supply, the question of which leaks will be fixed (and when they will be fixed) is one that is constantly being negotiated through engineers' everyday work.
For instance, in K-East ward, just one of Mumbai's twenty-four wards, nearly three thousand leakages were reported in one year alone. 12 Over six hundred of these -almost two per day -were classified in the Castalia study as "major joint leaks and bursts." Knowing leakage as a normal event of water supply, engineers in Mumbai are not too concerned about its measurement. Instead, they have to decide which leakages to fix and which others to leave be. As they confront thousands of leaks a year, engineers speak of working on a "firefighting" model and attend only to the problems that they are -for social, political, and material reasons -unable to ignore. 13 12. According to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (n.d.), K-East ward has a population of 806,360 and an area of twenty-eight square kilometers.
13. Amid the thousands of leaks that fill their everyday schedules with work, engineers working in the city's ward offices are only too aware that governing water is difficult precisely because of the deeply ambivalent, unknown, and fungible relations between what is apparent and what is real and between what is physical and what is social.
To understand the everyday work of engineers, I would sometimes accompany Patankar, a city water engineer, on his "field" visits. Trained at an engineering college in a nearby city, Patankar had, for the past twenty years, lived and worked in the same ward. He was familiar therefore with its diverse neighborhoods, their pipes, their leaders, and their residents. Identified by many as a diligent public servant, Patankar oversaw the maintenance of mains and service connections in the ward. He fixed many of the leaks in the infrastructure with his experience and expertise. He took great care in deciding which leakages to attend to and which others he needed to fail to report so that he could continue working in the department (if he were to report all the leakages he knew about, his position there might be made very difficult).
As I rode on the back of his motorcycle from one water problem to another, I was struck by the way that Patankar -the water expert -approached each problem with an eye for improvisation, metis (practical knowledge) that he could have learned only on the job (see Scott 1988) . In December 2007, we rode across the ward to investigate a leaky main. I had been to the line previously, just a couple of weeks before, when city workers were patching it up. A few nights earlier, the pipe had burst again, and residents of the neighboring ward had not received water for two days. Patankar told me that he had been working long hours just to locate where the burst was. The city's infrastructure wasn't cooperating with his efforts. The pipe lay approximately ten meters under the surface of the street. Patankar had told me that whenever his team tried to uncover the pipe, the sodden, marshy soil would collapse over it again. As we got off the bike and walked toward the troublesome pipe, we crossed over a bridge. I noticed a different pipe running along it. Many water connections came out of this pipe, some of which did not look very legal. One of these connections was leaking with high pressure into the nalla (drain) below. Patankar didn't even give this pipe a second glance. He walked toward the sixty-one-centimeter water main, where the bigger problem lay. To do his work, Patankar required an experiential knowledge of how to locate the unseen problem. Nevertheless, to do so, he needed to overlook instances of leakage that he could see.
We arrived at the site to find water department employees and heavy machinery already at work. A shop had once stood where the maintenance team was now unearthing the large pipe. As we paused for a moment to look at the works, a couple of people came up to talk to us. "Will you cut our water again?" one of them asked, referring to a two-day cut when the pipe was being repaired previously. Not suggesting that water would be cut, nor telling them that it wouldn't, Patankar assured them that they would be notified if the former would be the case. The other person wasn't as pleased. He objected to the work project and aggressively complained of how a shop had stood there for two years before it was demolished to do these maintenance works. If Patankar was worried by his intransigence, he didn't show it. Instead, he smiled and asked after the changing uses of the land: "Who told him to build a shop on a water line?" Patankar asked of the (absent) shopkeeper. "Did the pipe come first or the shop?" "The pipe, of course," the petitioner observed, somewhat silenced by the question.
As we spoke, the maintenance team was trying to find a valve that could shut off the water to the burst pipe so that they could better inspect it. Patankar walked across another bridge and, noting a thick metal sheet that lay by the roadside, asked his four men to move it aside. As they grunted and heaved the sheet, they found an opening into the ground. There, about three meters deep, lay a layer of water, below which a manhole cover was faintly visible. Patankar asked whether it might be possible for the maintenance crew to go into the manhole and find the valve that way. The crew members, each with firm opinions about the matter at hand, were understandably unenthusiastic. They suggested that they lower a camera to do the same work. Patankar agreed and wondered whether his crew could do this work during supply hours, when water was flowing through the line. The junior staff disagreed again, citing the difficulty of seeing what was going on in the pipe if there was water flowing through it. Instead, they agreed to come back with a camera the next day. Seeing that the problem would need another day to be solved, Patankar said a few words to the supervisor before we left the site to attend to another problem.
The everyday work of fixing water connections drew my attention to the contingency, improvisation, and social/material mediation that Patankar employed to maintain the water network in working condition. If maintaining water pipes required a metis for repair and recovery (Scott 1998) , it was nevertheless a form of knowledge that was contested among the employees of the water department. The repair of pipes also required water engineers to recognize that their authority was compromised by the soaking, uncertain materialities that the city's water infrastructure was situated in. As Patankar struggled to find just where the leak was, he needed to deal with the unique events produced by each water problem amid restive political subjects and expert labor, the opacity of water and earth, and the corrosions, containments, and concealments of the pipe network. In the absence of standardized protocols that could apprehend and direct how this leak could be known and plugged, state authority was diffuse and emerged through negotiations between the experts, situations, and objects of Mumbai's water infrastructure. To maintain and govern the city's water network effectively, Patankar needed to know certain key facts about the line (e.g., where the leak was and how it might be found and patched). He also needed to know how this infrastructure was situated in relations of labor, nature, materiality, and the law. To repair a hydraulic line that was permeated by contingency and obduracy required power, knowledge, and also an ignorance of people, things, and their political situations.
My time with Patankar revealed how his knowledges and ignorances of leakage are situated in diverse formations of materiality, technology, and social life (Haraway 1991) . These structures of knowing and not knowing are not extensively controlled by either experts or subjects in the city. Neither state officials nor community leaders know everything that matters about the water network. Nor is the knowledge about water infrastructure controlled and managed exclusively by the engineers of the water department. Instead, the knowledges and ignorances of the water system run in and out of various institutions, localities, and political formations (see Hansen and Verkaaik 2009) . These situated knowledges and ignorances trouble expectations of how knowledge is produced and how state bureaucracies work (Weber 2006; Hull 2012b) .
Engineers in different positions in the water department are each ignorant and knowledgeable of water flows in different ways. 14 For instance, ward engineers, who face water demands from residents they are either legally or structurally unable to help, participate in the production of ignorance about the ways that many otherwise ineligible residents are connected to the water system. As engineers sometimes work with local political leaders, they tacitly sanction different kinds of connections for marginalized groups. These "leakages" are not documented, nor are they visible to their superiors in the head office. These structures of knowing and not knowing make the political control of water a diffuse and actively negotiated process. To illustrate this point, I give the following example.
One day I arrived at the field engineer's office to find the city councilor there with a party worker. Patankar (the engineer) was being courteous and receptive. As I tried to gather what was going on, I slowly realized that it was a negotiation about an illegal connection. Months before, certain tenements were in the news. They were threatening the sanctity of a site of cultural importance, and the court had ordered that the water connections of the tenements be cut. Patankar was compelled to follow the court's order and cut the pipes. Now a party functionary who worked in the area had come for permission to reconnect the lines. Patankar 14. On the one hand, senior engineers in the planning office effectively mobilize demand-andsupply figures not only to circulate to the media but also to adjudicate the allocations of water distributed to each ward. On the other hand, unlike field engineers, hydraulic planners have little knowledge of the political geographies of leakage in the city.
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responded by neither approving nor refusing his request: "What did I tell you then? I said I have to cut the connection. After I cut it, you can do what you want."
With this single directive, Patankar fulfilled his duty as a public officer twice over. He carried out the court's order, cutting the pipes, while allowing its contradiction -water supply -to continue by other means. His instruction relinquished some of his knowledge and control over the ward's water pipes to the realm of ignorance and to the party workers, plumbers, and residents who knew about them. This was not an exceptional incident. Engineers like Patankar were constantly guiding councilors and plumbers through and around the water department's tortuous rules, marshaling the powers of ignorance and ignoring the rules when they proved too exclusive. Such practices of ignorance -"do what you want" (don't tell me) -relieved the pressure on city engineers to deliver water and point to important ways that ignorance, indifference, and enforcement are arbitrarily mobilized to produce state authority in the city (Gupta 2012; Herzfeld 1992; Holston and Appadurai 1996) . In allowing councilors, their party workers, and plumbers to make connections without the written approval of the water department, these practices of ignorance both produce diverse ways that settlers are able to access public services and, in so doing, maintain the political authority of city councilors and water engineers in the city.
I was unable to follow up with this party worker to learn whether he ever made the water connection, and I am unsure that Patankar followed up either. If the party worker did reconnect the water line, then the water supply would return to his voting clients' homes as "leakage." As area engineers of the water department participate in the production of leakage, those working in the head offices of the water department or the World Bank are unable to parse out how much water is leaking to unauthorized groups or even where these connections exist. This leakage, and the ignorance about this leakage, produces leaks in the structures of control of the public system, gaps that are critical in that they both enable populations to live in the city despite the law and yet marginalize them by placing them beyond the accounting regimes of the state.
Conclusion: The Difficulties of Leakage
One afternoon I took Patankar to lunch so that we could talk a little bit more about the water system. In the quiet, air-conditioned environs of the restaurant, Patankar reviewed his methodology. People get angry when they don't get water, he told me. "It's our job to find and fix the problem," he said simply. He questioned the assumption that engineers of a private company might be able to do the job more effectively, given their expectations of revenue, and the watertight management regimes with which they were more preoccupied. The pursuit of revenue (or the reduction of NRW) often came at the cost of understanding the materiality and politics of the system. "Even the chief engineer of the water department, a few years ago, said that he doesn't understand how the system works," Patankar said. "How will these private fellows manage?"
As Patankar described the difficulty that even the most senior and qualified engineers have in knowing how the system works, I recalled Haresh's cautions about the difficulties that water's workers have in measuring its various quantities. The differentiated social, material, and political relations through which water is delivered through public infrastructures trouble attempts both by city engineers and by World Bank consultants to know the quantities and qualities of water flow in Mumbai by the procedures of audit and measurement. Indeed, when Haresh reminds us that water has "technical constraints," he is urging us to recognize how its confounding movements through the city's infrastructure reveal the limits not of water but of the audit cultures that management consultants deploy in their effort to reform its flows. As such, when the consultants attempted to derive values for the water balance, they needed to speculate that there was no relation between the social and physical agents of loss. Their efforts to provide stable and reproducible protocols for doing so were successfully challenged by a historical relation between the leaky politics of pipes and the engineers of the city water department. This is not to say that leakage is impossible to diagnose and fix with existing technologies. Nor is it to say that settlers who are denied formal water connections celebrate the socially and politically mediated leakages that hydrate their lives. Rather, I wish to suggest that the accreted histories of law, technology, and politicsthe intermittent supply, aging pipes, laws proscribing access, fickle meters, engineers allocating water -made it extremely difficult for the consultants to count, know, and reform the leaky pipes of the city. As hidden and subterranean amalgams of physical and social relations, the technologies and politics of water infrastructures challenge experts seeking to control their flows. With their control both constituted and compromised by the leaky materials and politics of the city's water infrastructure, consultants for the World Bank have thus far been unable to structurally reform the city's water system. Their inability points not only to the limits of the audit cultures of neoliberalism to govern the flow of essential resources but also to the compromised, yet significant, effects of democratic politics in Mumbai, particularly as it produces and encourages leaky technologies of rule. 15 15. Elsewhere (Anand 2011b) , I describe how the everyday relations of the water system reveal a critical shift in the relative powers of the technocratic and democratic state in the city (see also Chatterjee 2004; Chakrabarty 2007; Das 2011). In this technopolitical environment, leakages are often easier to leave be than to repair, seal, and foreclose. They are not an exception but a condition of Mumbai's water supply infrastructure.
Michel Callon in his work on engineering has urged us to note how infrastructures and technologies are brought into being by relations not only between social actors but also between "a mass of silent others" -human and nonhuman -and their enabling environments. Engineers, he argues, are only too aware of the ways that "technical, scientific, social, economic, or political considerations are inextricably bound up" (Callon 1989: 84) . As these relations always both exceed and render unstable regimes of knowledge production and practices of audits and measurement, engineers in state bureaucracies are compelled to leave out the chaos from their designs, in order to work (Scott 1998: 47 ; see also Barry 2001) . Indeed, water department engineers in Mumbai recognize that the leaky materials and politics that form Mumbai's water infrastructure compromise their control and regulation of water in the city. Accordingly, department engineers have more modest demands of the network. Far from a technocratic management of the network, engineers actively negotiate and ignore the multiple claims made by the leaks and flows in the city's power-soaked infrastructure. They seek to make the uncertainties of the water system predictable not by producing knowledge about leakages but by ignoring them where they can. In so doing, their work produces a durable and yet "porous" form of state authority in the city (Benjamin 2005) .
Thus it is not only water, and power and knowledge, but also leakage and ignorance that are critical to the formation of Mumbai's hydraulic state and to its leaders and experts. The state that is produced and reproduced through the management of ignorance in Mumbai's water system is not one of "total power," based on control of pipes, infrastructures, and watersheds (Wittfogel 1957; Worster 1985) , nor is the state here confined to an "effect" that is formed through practices of discourse, ideology, and the imagination (Abrams 1988) . The hydraulic state that is formed and reproduced through the management of Mumbai's water infrastructure is a social-material assemblage, an unstable process of relations between social imaginaries, institutions, human bodies, and things that is always in formation and always falling apart. As experts, engineers, and residents constantly manage to restore flows of water through the leaky, creaky system, they work with its histories of exclusion, dynamic political claims, and new technical forms to reproduce unstable, yet durable, forms of both the state and its subjects in the city. By selectively mobilizing certain statistics that reproduce its authority (e.g., population, miles of pipe, per capita usage, and number of connections), and ignoring others that challenge it (e.g., leakage figures), the city water department has brought the hydraulic state into being by building, maintaining, and operating the city's water infrastructure over the past 150 years. This is not to say that the city water department is a stable arbiter of water in the city. The unknown flows of water in and through Mumbai's hydraulic state also render it more porous, both to political claims and to projects of reform. As engineers rush around the city "firefighting" the crises that are regularly and chronically produced by the city's water system, leakages render the water department vulnerable to the claims of differentiated urban residents, as well as reform projects of multilateral agencies like the World Bank. As water continues to quietly and persistently leak, eating away at the pipes and the earth of the city, such unknown and unknowable flows of water literally produce dramatic sinkholes in the city. 16 These extraordinary gaps of authority and control make visible the obduracy and power of water and its infrastructures in the city. They demonstrate how leakages are central to the form and performance of government and, at the same time, corrode the very grounds of government upon which the city stands.
